BEFORE THE WASHINGTON STATE EXECUTIVE ETHICS BOARD

In the matter of: OAH NO. 01-2019-AGO-00032
THERESE FERRERIA,

Respondent. EEB NO. 2018-008

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER ON BOARD STAFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1.1 On April 10, 2017, the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) initiated an administrative investigation of Therese Ferreria (Ms. Ferreria), Title IV-E Training and Quality Assurance Manager. On September 12, 2017, an investigation report was issued by the Centralized Investigations Unit, DSHS Children’s Administration.

1.2 On January 9, 2018, the Executive Ethics Board (Board) received a complaint alleging that Ms. Ferreria may have violated the Ethics in Public Service Act (Ethics Act) by receiving an “honorarium” for attending federally sponsored training in addition to receiving her normal salary by the state during her attendance at that training.

1.3 On August 27, 2018, the Board found reasonable cause to believe that a violation of RCW 42.52 was committed.

1.4 An evidentiary hearing in this matter is scheduled for January 9, 2020.
1.5 On October 10, 2019, Board Staff, through counsel, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Motion), requesting that the Board find that Ms. Ferreria violated the Ethics Act, RCW 42.52 and impose sanctions. The Motion was brought pursuant to WAC 10-08-135.

1.6 On October 24, 2019, Ms. Ferreria filed a response to the Motion, which Board Staff, through counsel, replied to on November 1, 2019.

1.7 After due and proper notice, a hearing was held on the motion for summary judgment. The hearing was held at the Board offices at Bristol Court in Olympia, Washington, convening on November 8, 2019. Administrative Law Judge TJ Martin from the Office of Administrative Hearings conducted the proceedings, and Board Chair Shirley Battan, and members Lisa Marsh and Anna Dudek Ross were present. Also present was Assistant Attorney General, Michelle A. Carr, legal advisor to the Board. The Board’s Executive Director, Kate Reynolds, and other Board Staff members were present.

1.8 Chad C. Standifer, Assistant Attorney General, represented Board Staff.

1.9 Ms. Ferreria represented herself.

1.10 Board Staff filed the following documents:

- Board Staff’s Motion for Summary Judgment;
- Declaration of David Killeen in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, with attached Exhibits 1-15; and
- Board Staff’s Reply to Response of Therese Ferreria in Opposition to Board Staff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

1.11 Ms. Ferreria filed the following documents:

- Response of Therese Ferreria in Opposition to Board Staff’s Motion for Summary Judgment; and
- Declaration of Therese Ferreria in Opposition to Board Staff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, with attached Exhibits A-E.

1.12 The proceedings were recorded and open to the public.

1.13 The hearing was adjourned on November 8, 2019.
Based on the documents filed and evidence presented, the Board enters the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on Board Staff's Motion for Summary Judgment:

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

2.1 Ms. Ferreria is a former DSHS employee who began working for the agency in 1988. She was appointed to the position of Title IV-E Policy Training and Quality Assurance Manager on July 16, 2001. Decl. of Killeen Ex. 4.

2.2 The Title IV-E Foster Care Program is managed by the United States Children's Bureau (Children's Bureau) organized under the United States Department of Health and Human Services Administration. Decl. of Killeen Ex. 5. Title IV-E Foster Care Program funds are awarded to all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and federally recognized Indian tribes to assist with costs of foster care maintenance programs, program management administrative expenses, and training for staff, foster parents and certain private agency staff. *Id.* at 1.

2.3 Title IV-E compliance reviews are conducted by a team of federal and Title IV-E agency representatives. Reviewers examine child and provider case records, as well as payment documentation to validate the accuracy of a state agency's Title IV-E reimbursement claims of foster care payments. Decl. of Killeen Ex. 5 at 2. Reviewers also detail strengths and weaknesses of a state's program and identify any technical assistance needed for program improvement. *Id.*

2.4 JBS International (JBS), located in Bethesda Maryland, is the federally contracted vendor with the Children's Bureau to oversee Title IV-E reviews. Decl. of Killeen Ex. 5 at 4.

2.5 On January 5, 2016, Ms. Ferreria received an email from JBS, identifying her as a Child and Family Services Reviewer (CFSR) Applicant. Decl. of Killeen Ex. 6. The email indicated that in order to qualify as a CFSR, Ms. Ferreria was required to attend a two-day, in-person training. *Id.* at 1. The two-day training sessions were available February 22-23, February
The email further indicated that JBS would be sending Ms. Ferreria a training agreement to sign in order to receive reimbursement for her attendance at the March 7-8, 2016 training. \textit{Id.}

2.6 Ms. Ferreria's supervisor, Dan Ashby, approved Ms. Ferreria's attendance for the March 2016 training. Decl. of Killeen Ex. 1 at 13.

2.7 JBS reimbursed Ms. Ferreria $252.98 for food and travel expenses, excluding airfare and hotel cost. Decl. of Killeen Ex. 7 at 4. Additionally, Ms. Ferreria submitted an "Honorarium Voucher" to JBS and received $300 for attendance at the March 7-8, 2016, training. \textit{Id.} at 2. The $300 was in addition to Ms. Ferreria's state salary received for the same two days.

2.8 In January 2017, JBS informed Ms. Ferreria via email that in order to qualify as a CFSR, she was again required to attend a two-day, in-person training. Decl. of Killeen Ex. 8.

2.9 Ms. Ferreria attended the additional two-day CFSR Reviewer training on March 22-23. Decl. of Killeen Ex. 9. Ms. Ferreria traveled to this training on March 21 and returned on March 23. Decl. of Killeen Ex. 10.

2.10 Mr. Ashby did not approve Ms. Ferreria's attendance for the March 2017 training because she had already attended a similar training and Mr. Ashby did not believe that further training benefited her job. Decl. of Killeen Ex. 1 at 13.

2.11 Ms. Ferreria did not submit authorization for out-of-state travel to attend either the March 2016, or March 2017, trainings. Ms. Ferreria believed that because the state was not paying for the training, approval was not required. Decl. of Killeen Ex. 1 at 20.

2.12 DSHS Administrative Policy 19.10.12 (A) Out-of-State Travel Approvals, states: \textit{Out-of-state travel must be pre-approved and requires additional approval as shown on the Out-of-State Travel document posted on the DSHS Travel Website.} Decl. of Killeen Ex. 11.
Ms. Ferreria did not submit leave for attending the March 2016 or March 2017, CFSR trainings, and received her normal state salary during the time she attended the training. Decl. of Killeen Ex. 12.

In May 2016, JBS hired Headway Workforce Solutions to manage the payroll for people training to become CFSR Reviewers. Decl. of Killeen Ex. 1 at 37.

From February 20, 2017, through October 2017, Headway paid Ms. Ferreria. Id. Ms. Ferreria was paid $25 an hour for participation in an online training held on February 20, 2017, (2 hours) and for her participation in the March 2017, CFSR training in Maryland (16 hours). Id. In total Ms. Ferreria was paid $450 for the two trainings and received $240.98 as reimbursement for meals and incidentals. Id.

Ms. Ferreria confirmed receipt of the “honorarium,” but denied it was a salary, asserting that it was a bonus for attending training. Id.

Section B(13) of DSHS Administrative Policy 18.64, Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees, approved by the Board on July 8, 2011, specifically prohibits DSHS employees from receiving honorarium. Decl. of Killeen Ex. 13 at 3.

Ms. Ferreria did not submit authorization for outside employment. Decl. of Killeen ¶ 18.

DSHS Administrative Policy 18.18, Outside Employment, requires DSHS employees to request approval for outside employment. Decl. of Killeen Ex. 14.

On December 13, 2017, Ms. Ferreria received a reprimand from DSHS, in part based upon her failure to submit leave for March 21-23, 2017, and was directed to submit leave for her unauthorized absence on those dates. Decl. of Killeen Ex. 15.

Ms. Ferreria asserts that she was an exemplary employee for over 35 years and that she always followed the rules when it was clear to her that they apply. Ms. Ferreria claimed to have no knowledge that it was impermissible to receive an “honorarium” for participating in trainings. Additionally, Ms. Ferreria claims that her supervisor never requested that she take
leave to attend training, never requested that she receive authorization for out-of-state travel, and
did not require her to receive approval for outside employment.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

3.1 The Board has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to RCW 42.52.360(1),
which authorizes the Board to enforce the Ethics Act with respect to employees in the executive
branch of state government. The Board has jurisdiction over Ms. Ferreria, whose actions
occurred while she was a state employee. The complaint was filed in accordance with
RCW 42.52.410, the Board found reasonable cause pursuant to RCW 42.52.420, and an
adjudicative proceeding was conducted pursuant to RCW 42.52.430. All the required procedural
notices have been provided.

3.2 WAC 10-08-135 provides that a motion for summary judgment may be granted
and an order issued if the written record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The object and function of
a summary judgment is to avoid a useless trial. Hudesman v. Foley, 73 Wn. 2d 880, 886, 441
P.2d 532 (1968). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ellis v. City of Seattle, 142 Wn.
2d 450, 458, 13 P.3d 1065 (2000); see CR 56(c).

The basic facts of this matter are not in dispute, rendering resolution of this matter by
summary judgment appropriate. There is no factual dispute that Ms. Ferreria received
compensation from JBS for attending trainings in March 2016, and March 2017. There is also
no dispute that Ms. Ferreria received her regular state pay for the days during which she attended
the trainings. Last, it is undisputed that Ms. Ferreria did not receive out-of-state travel
authorization for the March 2017, training.

3.3 The Ethics Act governs the conduct of state officers and employees. Under
RCW 42.52.430(5), a violation must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
3.4 RCW 42.52.110 provides that no state employee:

[M]ay, directly or indirectly, ask for or give or receive or agree to receive any compensation, gift, reward, or gratuity from a source for performing or omitting or deferring the performance of any official duty, unless otherwise authorized by law except: (1) The state of Washington; or (2) in the case of officers or employees of institutions of higher education or of the *Spokane intercollegiate research and technology institute, a governmental entity, an agency or instrumentality of a governmental entity, or a nonprofit corporation organized for the benefit and support of the state employee’s agency or other state agencies pursuant to an agreement with the state employee’s agency. (Reviser’s note omitted).

3.5 RCW 42.52.160(1) states:
No state officer or state employee may employ or use any person, money, or property under the officer’s or employee’s official control or directions, or in his or her official custody, for the private benefit or gain of the officer, employee, or another.

3.6 Ms. Ferreria does not dispute the basic facts, supporting violations of the Ethics Act and her length of public service does not cure her violations. Furthermore, her attempts to shift the blame for her misconduct to her former supervisor are not persuasive. DSHS has clear policies, governing out-of-state travel, receipt of “honorarium,” and it was Ms. Ferreria’s responsibility, as a DSHS employee, to comply with these polices.

3.7 Based on the above Findings of Fact, the Board concludes that Ms. Ferreria, by a preponderance of the evidence, violated RCW 42.52.110 by receiving payment for attendance at the March 2016 training in violation of DSHS Administrative Policy 18.64 while also receiving her regular salary.

3.8 Based on the above Findings of Fact, The Board also concludes that Ms. Ferreria violated RCW 42.52.160(1) by receiving a private benefit in the form of compensation for participation in unapproved trainings in February and March of 2017.

3.9 Under RCW 42.52.480, the Board may impose a civil penalty of up to $5,000 per violation or three times the economic value of anything received or sought in violation of the Ethics Act, whichever is greater. The Board concludes that a $1,500 penalty for each of Ms.
Ferreria's violations of RCW 42.52.110 and RCW 42.52.160(1), totaling $3,000, is appropriate.

The Board considered the factors discussed below in assessing this penalty.

3.10 In determining the appropriate sanction, the Board may review the nature of the violation, as well as aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors set forth in WAC 292-120-030. The Board may consider the monetary cost of the violation, including the cost of the violation to the state and the value of anything received or sought in the violation. Id. Here, Ms. Ferreria’s violations tend to reduce public respect for or confidence in state government or state government officers or employees. WAC 292-120-030(2)(e). It is a mitigating factor that Ms. Ferreria was subject to prior corrective action, a reprimand, by DSHS. WAC 292-120-030(4)(a).

3.11 Ms. Ferreria argues that her penalty should be less than that assessed against fellow DSHS employee Robert Ensley (Mr. Ensley) because while she had limited involvement with JBS, Mr. Ensley worked as a CFSR reviewer since 2001 and attended numerous reviews. However, for the five-year time period in which the statute of limitations allowed the Board Staff to review Mr. Ensley’s conduct, he engaged in behavior similar to Ms. Ferreria’s, which makes the imposition of a comparable penalty appropriate. Additionally, Mr. Ensley stipulated to violations of the Ethics Act.

IV. ORDER

4.1 Board Staff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

4.2 It is hereby ordered that Therese Ferreria is assessed a total monetary civil penalty of $3,000 based on her violations of RCW 42.52.110 and RCW 42.52.160(1).

4.3 The total amount of $3,000 is payable in full within 90 days of the effective date of this Order.
DATED this 17th day of December 2019.

WASHINGTON STATE EXECUTIVE ETHICS BOARD

Shirley Battan, Chair
APPEAL RIGHTS

RECONSIDERATION OF FINAL ORDER – BOARD

Any party may ask the Executive Ethics Board to reconsider a Final Order. The request must be in writing and must include the specific grounds or reasons for the request. The request must be delivered to Board office within 10 days after the postmark date of this order.

The Board is deemed to have denied the request for reconsideration if, within 20 days from the date the request is filed, the Board does not either dispose of the petition or serve the parties with written notice specifying the date by which it will act on the petition. RCW 34.05.470.

The Respondent is not required to ask the Board to reconsider the Final Order before seeking judicial review by a superior court. RCW 34.05.470.

FURTHER APPEAL RIGHTS – SUPERIOR COURT

A Final Order issued by the Executive Ethics Board is subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, chapter 34.05 RCW. See RCW 42.52.440. The procedures are provided in RCW 34.05.510 -.598.

The petition for judicial review must be filed with the superior court and served on the Board and any other parties within 30 days of the date that the Board serves this Final Order on the parties. RCW 34.05.542(2). Service is defined in RCW 34.05.542(4) as the date of mailing or personal service.

A petition for review must set forth:

(1) The name and mailing address of the petitioner;

(2) The name and mailing address of the petitioner’s attorney, if any;

(3) The name and mailing address of the agency whose action is at issue;

(4) Identification of the agency action at issue, together with a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of the agency action;
(5) Identification of persons who were parties in any adjudicative proceedings that led to
the agency action;

(6) Facts to demonstrate that the petitioner is entitled to obtain judicial review;

(7) The petitioner's reasons for believing that relief should be granted; and

(8) A request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief requested.

RCW 34.05.546.

ENFORCEMENT OF FINAL ORDERS

If there is no timely request for reconsideration, this is the Final Order of the Board. The
Respondent is legally obligated to pay any penalty assessed.

The Board will seek to enforce a Final Order in superior court and recover legal costs
and attorney’s fees if the penalty remains unpaid and no petition for judicial review has been
timely filed under chapter 34.05 RCW. This action will be taken without further order by the
Board.